INTERNAL SECURITY - CHALLENGES AND APPROACH
In an age of sabotage and terrorism, no man, no place and no structure is
really safe; no time of the day or night can be construed as safe. With the
increasing complexity of human society, with increasing claims on limited
resources of the world, the kettle of human life is spilling over with organised
hatred and violence. Terrorism has become an international phenomenon.
Accrescent unemployment makes terrorism popular by giving unemployed
youths a raison d'etre for life and an ideology to pursue. The lopsided material
growth of the 20th century life at the cost of contentment and inner peace,
endeared to man the thrills and adventures of the life that fill up his inner void.
New scientific inventions give man such sophisticated mechanisms and
machinery that he can do anything he wants without being personally.present at
a place. Each man has potentially become a power centre and he can build or
destroy the world he lives in. Each man has become a force to reckon with in
the survival of this Earth. The rise in hatred and violence in the present world,
compounded with the man's dangerous power to wreak vengeance avec
acharnement made internal security an unsure field. It replaced the avital police
function of crime control and maintenance of law and order to become the
primary gauntlet of the police.
Police on an unequal job
The threat to internal security is posed by highly trained, highly motivated
volunteers belonging to highly organised and highly resourceful terrorist outfits.
The unenviable task of providing protection to men, places and structures from
these committed zealots on the antipode with the precious choice of time, place
and target in their favour and any number of sophisticated methods and
techniques of strike to choose from, continually sap the manpower, machinery
and other resources of the police. The police, with its forfaim organisation and
approach to challenge, is found to be too nonpareil to the dimensions of the
problem even in advanced countries. The pressure sine dubio helped the police
to walk a la hauteur de its adversaries with regard to plans of modernisation,
though far en arrier. What should have been is the other way round, that is, the
police keeping me lead in modernisation techniques and the antipode marching
to keep pace with the police. Unfortunately, it is not to be in the Indian
situation.
Lack of ground work
In absence of strength, resources, plans and the confidence to meet the
gauntlets of terrorism, the reaction of the police to terrorist threats is desperate
mobbing and covering the target at best and diffident immobilisation at the
worst. The inability of the police to penetrate highly raisonne terrorist
organisations and get an insight into their goal, plan and method of work put it
at a costly disadvantage. The failure of the police to draw up detailed long-term
plans to meet terrorist challenges handicaps it in its operations. It is just non
pnssumus to guarantee internal security sans a sound knowledge of the terrorists
and their proclivities and a systematic ruse de guerre to checkmate them in
carefully drawn-out phases. Terrorists are not the stuffs and internal security is
not the telos to be dealt with in bits and farthings as and when challenges arc
posed.
Spasmodic approach to security challenges
An internal security machinery working in a void often gives rise to
ludicrous security reactions. Anonymous calls or letters in most unlikely
situations arc attended to with a desperate mobilisation of men and machinery
a grands frais to the stale exchequer sans any research into the call or the letter
and everything ends up as a hoax. Any number of such instances are available
in recent Indian police history. An anonymous Kannada letter claimed to have
been wrilicn by LTTE cadres was received in Mysore with a threat of blowing
up the KRS dam on the intervening night of 14 and 15 of August, 1991 and was
later followed with similar threats of blowing up Vidhana Soudha on me same
night. The comminations were followed with exoteric security paraffle at all those places to the fun of the plebeian. A right kenner to the LTTE objectives,
expertise and method of operation would have brevi manu dismissed the calls
and the letters as a non-event. The Karnataka police had to prepare itself en
plein jour for an emergency because it was not prepared and equipped to handle
internal security problems with courage and confidence. It is not wrong to gear
up the police machinery to the level of procinct to meet challenges even in cases
of suspected threats. But, such security could have been given more subtly
without fanfare, flare of reclame and undue show of strength, to save the police
from being a laughing stock. The desperate police reaction in such patently
unlikely situations may prompt mischievous elements to shoot similar missives
almost daily. Can the police react to all those letters similarly? The desperate
reaction of the police only betrayed a lack of courage and confidence 'n meeting
the needs of internal security. No show of strength can ever provide real
security. It is subtle planning and conticent operation that make security
possible. All security arrangements must be preceded by thorough research and
detailed operational plans. This is completely forgotten in the Indian situation.
Need of silent and planned approach
In an expertly drawn-up operational plan of sabotage, minimum possible
number of people are involved, usually one or two apart from the logistic
support. It is quality that counts and not quantity in sabotage and security
operations. The minimum number of people who really execute the sabotage arc
highly motivated and highly trained, competent individuals, capable of keel
operation. No sabotage operation depends upon the strength of manpower nor
can it hope to succeed by the number of people, involuted. Rather, the larger the
number, the smaller the chances of success because of human nature,
coordination problems and higher chances of leakage of subtle operational
details. It also involves the problem of providing security and escape routes for
more men in the post-operational period. Ergo, it is futile to depend on the
strength of manpower and machinery at the cost of quality in security plans. No
numbers can stop a highly motivated and trained man from sneaking upto his
target and blowing it up with modern gadgetry which are next to impossible to
detect. What is required is not companies of policemen, but a handful of highly
qualified and motivated men of experience with an intelligent, thoroughly
drawn-up security plan, based on competent intelligence inputs about the objects
and operational plans of the adversary. Everything except these salient features
of an internal security plan is present in the responses of the Indian police to
security challenges.
Overhauling of police system
The police force in India was raised imprimis to tackle crime and
law-and-order problems. Its recruitment, training and on-the-field experience
programmes stress upon the elements required to tackle those problems. The
Indian police organisation, in its stiff hierarchical order and discipline, is geared
to meet these challenges. There is little scope in the present police for the
growth of an aptitude other than for these deja vu functions. No effort was
made to overhaul the police even after security challenges have superated in
their primacy in police functions. It should be borne in mind that the demands
on the police to meet security challenges are tout a fait distinct from the
demands to which the Indian police has long been accustomed. The aptitude
required to protect targets from determined esoteric strikes by terrorists is
antipodeal with the aptitude required for the show of strength, necessary to
suppress a loosely knit mob of wankle law-breakers. In spite of these ascensive
strains on the Indian police, its organisation and resources, due to the dangerous
spurt in security threats, it unfortunately has failed to abraid and overhaul its
system to amate the new challenges; the consectaneous fatalities of men and
other targets are steeply rising every year with a free hand to terrorist
reticulation to strike at will. The glitches of the Indian police in re internal
security are obvious by the fact that Indian soil has become a fertile ground to
breed and feed terrorist organisations. Every corner of India, has its own
terrorist outfit and each of these outfits has proved itself a pernicious challenge
to the Indian police. Never, even by chance, has the Indian police shown that it
can control a terrorist outfit. The fact is that even all armies of the world
together cannot bring a terrorist outfit to heel, unless the soft belly of the
terrorist outfit is subtly hit embusque by intelligent operations. Sadly, the Indian
police is yet to realise this fact.
Sabotage, terrorism and security risks are not phenomena pro tempore. They
are here to stay and the police must know to meet the situations they engender.
And threats to internal security, by all means, will assume demonic proportions
as time advances. The survival of the police in coming years depends upon its
ability lo meet the needs of internal security. It has no alternative but to overhaul
its passe system, organisation, operational methods, approach to work, training
and manpower resources to be able to do so. The faster it is done, the better.
For, the inability of the police in successfully handling security challenges is
resulting in fatalities almost every day.
Selection of right people
The first parameter for preparing the police for the future challenges of the
internal security is selecting right people with right aptitude, right abilities and
right background. This requires thorough job analysis in re the requirements to
handle the pertinent responsibilities. Choosing the right man from the motley to
inclip him to the ergon forms the foremost need of preparing the police for the
impending challenges. It should be realised that the need of such people to the
police overweighs the need of the police for these extraordinary species. As
internal security is a condition of national survival, no law, no fundamental
right, no directive principle nor any social welfare ideologies should interfere
with the recruitment of the right people. Internal security being a highly
sensitive and secretive job, each less than right man inside is a positive risk to
security operations. Further, such people are a drain on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the organisation. Ergo, avoiding people less than right for the
job is as important in recruitment as selecting the right person.
Selection on special footing
The people who fit-in to internal security responsibilities must have an
innate trait to give themselves to the job that they take up. They must be
sensitive people with a high commitment to their responsibilities with the
mental and physical agility to fulfil the task ex mero motu. Men of high
intelligence quotient, patience, aplomb and perseverance have to be immanent
in their nature. A profound sense of patriotism is an added qualification.
However, not many people having these rare qualities are readily available. It
must be a sacred duty of the security operators to ingest such rara avis to the
organisation wherever they are found and with whatever sacrifice. It is possible
only if recruitment to these places are made a postern affair at the highest level
without throwing recruitment open to competitions where all types of people
sneak in in malam partem for various reasons. Internal security, more often than
not, is an invious profession wherein life is committed to its objectives.
In the circumstances, the indraught to the fold must be agraste with respect
and behoofs in form of liberal purses and perks apart from more than generous
promotional and death-cum-retirements benefits that behove to the compulsive
commitment sine qua non for the job. This helps to widen the latitude of choice
by promising a belle vue which is pareil to its demands to the aspirants to this
difficile career.
Training
Having suitable manpower is one thing. Preparing them for the future
challenges is quite another. It is here that training comes into picture. Training
high-calibre, sensitive people is a much more responsible and arduous job. If the training is to prepare them for a sensitive job like internal security, the gravity of
the task gets -further compounded by the addition of another dimension to the
responsibility. The emphasis here is to raise the innate traits of the trainees to
desired levels. They should be moulded to be highly motivated, knowledgeable,
bright professionals with a flair for results. They must be taught to operate
without plangent attention and get maximum mileage from minimum basic
action. Such a training needs a carefully drawn-up training programme with
creative inputs. In sensitive jobs like internal security, grooming manpower
including recruitment and training is more vital than the job itself.
Security operations
All internal security operations must be part of a raisonne security plan that
is drawn out in advance after thorough research and study of the best available
intelligence on internal and external affairs, the geographical position of the
country, the internal and external economic situation, likely shifts in foreign
relations, objects and intentions of neighbouring countries, the dynamics of
ethnic, communal and linguistic interaction within the country and scientific
advances in weaponry and other gadgetry, having a bearing on the security
mailers. The security plan must foresee likely sources of trouble inside and
outside the country and cultivate undercover'operatois at sensitive spots either
by its own resources or through agents, often years or decades in advance to
keep an eye on developments, feed intelligence and control situations by
infiltration to strategic positions. Without this groundwork, no security
operation can make much headway. Such a long-drawn security plan that
foresees events decades ahead in the semiptemal interests of the state security
presumes foresightedness and a thorough study and research of facts by its
author to back up the plan. There is no sema of any such a plan obvious for
Indian internal security and what is happening around gives the triste impression
that the gauntlets of internal security are met day to day in line with meeting
daily law-and-order problems. The best India can gasconade now arc the
internal security schemes in police offices with names of sensitive targets and
general instructions about where and how they must be protected in emergencies
and normal days. These schemes are tout a fait wasted exercises in these days of
highly sophisticated terrorist strikes by organised terrorist outfits. More
important, the passe instructions in these supposedly secret official documents
are no more secret. Though some attempts are made to update these instructions
when a security lapse leads to a public outcry, none of such general instructions
can assure even a semblance of security in this age of sophistication. A
resourceful terrorist gladiator who is committed to execute his strike a tout prix
can hit his target at will malgre tout security precautions undertaken in
compliance to updated security instructions in Indian internal security schemes. It is obvious that the security lapses during Shri Rajiv Gandhi's Sriperumbudur
election campaign made the job of the LITE squad easy. At the same time, it
should be borne in mind that no measures by security outfits of India in its
present infaust state of affair would have prevented the committed and avizefull
cadres of the LTTE from accomplishing their devilish task. The killing would
have been merely a matter of time. There are infinite number of courses
available to a resourceful and inventive mind. It is in these circumstances that
India should invenit its new security outfit.
Knowledge of the security risks
Any security buildup must stand on two basic requirements; firstly, up-to-
date knowledge of the security risks and their strategies and secondly, a security
machinery devised to meet specific demands of the specific circumstances. A
thorough knowledge of the adversaries includes an in-depth knowledge of their
long and short term objectives, their time-to-time aberrations, strategies,
expertise, modes of operation, friends, enemies, sources of support, likely
change of strategies and their analyses to assess the possibility of security
threats and likely targets. Yes, it is a stupendous task involving huge manpower
and other resources a grands frais. Yet, it is worth the cost and trouble in the
interests of the national security and a far more intelligent and meaningful use of
human and material resources than spending them to indagate criminals after
they accomplish their pernicious job. Investigation of terrorism-oriented crimes
serves practically no purpose and makes no impact on the plan and strategies of
a well-planned terrorist outfit.
Specific security plans
A security build-up is infrangible only if it is specific fur each circumstance,
depending upon the needs as assessed by security experts from time to time.
Security must essentially be an esoteric operation with open eyes and ears and
closed mouth; with open mind and closed heart. It must be a shadowy operation
rather than a gust of light blinding people around. Intelligent terrorist operators
prefer to strike in this gust of light which is what security tends to be. A good
and pollent security plan should not have an open set-plan which by all
likelihood would be used by intelligent terrorists to their advantage. The
pollicitation of a good security plan depends upon its secretiveness, perspicacity
and ability to take even a well-prepared and resourceful terrorist operator by
surprise.
Ring round duty
Indian security plans lay stress on covering targets with armed men and
preventing people from approaching the threatened target. In absence of
adequate penetration to the source of threat, none of these pernoctation can have
any impact on the capabilities of a terrorist to strike his target. A human wall
around the target is an infructuous show of strength in an age where there are
powerful weapons and' ammunitions that can penetrate several such layers in a
single stroke. Even the best of the snipers protecting a target would be at a
disadvantage in felling a terrorist-to-strike who has all the advantages of time,
place, surprise and the mental and physical reflexes to superate both his target
and armed protectors. A well-planned terrorist attack fully prepares for all these
odd contretemps. Those around the target, posted to spot suspicious movements
among people are also at the same disadvantage. It is the skeely terrorist who is
keenly watching his target and men around versus the spotters staring blankly at
inconnu for suspicious movements. An intelligently chosen and thoroughly
trained terrorist operator can easily overcome this problem.
Screening of people
Another important strategy of the Indian security machinery is screening
people before permitting proximity to the threatened target. A resourceful
terrorist plan can facilely circumvent this with money, connections and
influence. There are infinite ingenious ways available to a resourceful and
imaginative man, determined to reach his target. In circumstances where a
police force remiss and ineffectual at best and corrupt at the worst is in charge
of screening as spotters, his job is facile and custom-made for his aptitude.
Quiet security
Indian security plans ignore the cardinal principle of a good security
reticulation namely, providing security without coming in the way of the normal
process of life of the target except where unavoidable. The minimum show of
force must form an inviolable part of the scheme. The leitmotif of an effective
security buildup is providing perfect security with minimum inconvenience to
the concerned. But, Indian security sleuths believe otherwise. They believe in
taking over the target a toute force to their control, modifying the normal course
and process of the target to their convenience with the least regard to whether
the target is a place, an installation, or a dignitary, as if they try to provide
security in exchange for the freedom of movement and action. And all this for
obviously ineffective security! This is ludicrous. Indian security reached this facetious ebb because it is diffident of even thinking of providing security to
targets an naturel. The fact is that it cannot provide true security in its present
mauvais ton in spite of dictating terms to the target. En principe, security is a
birthright and it should be available in that form with no constraints attached on
free movement. It is not to be so in the existing circumstances of Indian security
buildup and even national leaders in India accepted the fact by trading their
image and popularity for this supposed safety.
Relevance of present security arrangements
It is argued that the extant Indian security system is effective in discouraging
less resourceful terrorist outfits from attempting strikes and preventing half-
hearted attacks. The argument is not convincing for the reason that there can be
no lesser terrorist strikes in the present world. All terrorist outfits worth the
name in the present international situation are extremely resourceful with
serious objectives, plans and strategies and a complete commitment to carry out
their operational plans. Budding terrorist groups do not come into picture and
plans to provide security from them cannot be called security schemes. With
India's present security capabilities, no target is really out of reach from the
commination of a determined terrorist outfit. If a target of a terrorist outfit's hit-
list is not struck for a long time, the reasons for the same can be only three,
a) that the terrorist organisation has not really intended to strike the target,
b) that the outfit is yet to grow resourceful enough, or
c) that security sleuths
could gear up their machinery, taking this specific case as an exception to foil
the plans of the outfit concerned. India should reach a stage where the third
reason which is an exception becomes a rule in providing foolproof security to
all targets, all the time, sans throwing the normal course of life of the
threatened target to the winds.
Needs of a perficient security buildup
The Indian police system lays emphasis on dashing qualities rather than on
mental qualities and planning that form the elan vital of security policing. The
age-old police traits like a criant show of force and a strict adherence to
hierarchical order have a mesalliance with the needs of security operations
where patience, perseverance, calculating mind, an ingine to foresee
developments, speedy physical and mental reflexes, unbreachable sangfroid in
adverse situations, high commitment to the work in hand, initiative and above
all, courage to take responsibility for action decide the success or otherwise of
the security buildup. Indeed, these human qualities have to be reinforced with
neoteric security equipment including latest communication, transport,
information, weaponry and other security-oriented systems. The organisation
must have three full-fledged wings in charge of a) collection of intelligence,
b) process and assessment of security risks and c) field operation.
a) Collection of Intelligence
Collection of vital intelligence forms the pith of perficient security
operation. An effective security buildup perforce stands on the foundation of
strategic intelligence. The feracity of security basically depends on the quality
of intelligence as an input. A security organisation of neoteric age cannot
survive without an effective intelligence wing as a backup unit. And key
intelligence does not come freely. It has to be extracted at great risks from
closely guarded sources by resourceful intelligence operators. Often, such an
operation may require years of patient preparation by an undercover to cultivate
dependable insiders to the cause. These operations are potential comminations
to the mutual relation and ergo intelligence operators are left to their own fate
by employers when the operators are caught. Intelligence is a venal commodity
and iis price can be fixed in monetary terms. Collection of intelligence involves
huge expenditure to maintain organisation and communication reticulation,
support the logistics of the operations and at times to affect outright purchases
as well. It requires a huge army of highly-paid and expensive operators and
agents to cover places and groups that arc potentially security risks. The success
of security back home lout a fait depends upon the quality of the intelligence
sent back. In an age of bitter concours to win over or withhold a piece of
intelligence, double crosses or even triple crosses are au naturel. The situation
necessitates keeping an eye on these operators from a distance. In other words,
the intelligence collection setup is a very complicated machinery which always
must be maintained in top condition a grands frais as an important factor in an
internal security buildup.
b) Process and Assessment of Security Risks
The raw inputs from intelligence sources have to be winnowed, classified
and processed if found to have security relevance. Intelligence collection sans
processing is as good as, if not worse than, not collecting them at all. Raw
intelligence throws the national security to the winds by raising a maelstrom
wherein facts and fancies are complected beyond recognition. It blunts the
sensitivities of the sleuths and excoriates targets to real danger. The possibility
can be avoided by creating a nerve-centre, a command post in the security
organisation to process and assess intelligence inputs anent ground realities, past
history and known facts. This organisation must be manned by people au fait
and capable of reading between lines to arrive at right conclusions as well as invenit strategies in the interests of the internal security. This body must have a
flair for research and analysis and knowledge of the internal situation of the
country, dynamics of various factors that have bearing on the internal security
and possess an insight into minor developments that may blow up into serious
security risks at some future date. It must be constituted of carefully chosen
professionals with proven records of eximious work and a deep sense of
patriotism and commitment to their work and should be directly responsible to
the chief of the organisation and work as a high-power advisory body in all
matters pertaining to the security. The unit must function as a command-post
where intelligence inputs are instreamed and wherefrorn field operations
emanate.
c)Field Operation
Field operation is the cutting-edge of the security buildup. Other activities in
the organisation are just postern backups to the field operation that forms the
mainstay of the security organisation and inclips a vast portion of the
organisation's manpower, equipments, machinery, money, time and other
resources. If intelligence operators must have alert eyes and cars, security
analysts must have smart mental faculties and field-operators must have smart
reflexes inter alia. Only people with exceptional courage and perseverance and
daredevilry can behove to this job. Resourceful people with a plurisie of energy
and willingness to work hard in tramontane circumstances, rare single-
mindedness of purpose and devotion can alone be successful in the dangerous
world of field operations. They have to be pollent-willed people with the
procinct to risk their lives for the sake of achieving goals. Screening people for
these traits is not a facile job. This arduous job has to be performed with great
care and caution, for, the quality of internal security of the land depends upon
the work turned out by them. The people who are chosen for the job must be
able to provide security to men, places and structures, known to be sensitive and
comminated by enemies, while themselves remain in shades. Speed and
surprise are their chief attributes. Resourcefulness to do jobs which appear
impossible is their mainstay. Indeed, the demands arc too high and this
necessitates careful selection and recruitment, efficient training, high motivation
and liberal compensations in the form of generous pay, perks and expenditure
accounts. The people who play with their lives to meet the objectives of the
internal security have to be treated well for the risks to which they willingly
submit themselves in the interests of the country and its internal security.
Glitches of Indian security setup
A coup d'oel over the security surroundings of India gives an insipid taste,
be it about security intelligence, security planning or security operation. The
bungling of the Indian police at Konanakunte recently where they failed to
capture Sivarasan and Subha of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case is a recent
paradigm. The chance intelligence as early as on 18-8-91 that both the
extremists were holed up with others in a ramshackle house at Konanakunte
could not help Indian security forces to catch them alive with all time, resources
and the element of surprise at their disposal while the handful of desperados
inside the walled structure had no knowledge of what was happening around
them. This primarily reflects grim glitches in the field of security planning in
India. A little use of the faculty of thinking and planning and ingine to retain an
even keel under pressure would not have made capturing the extremists alive a
difficile goal to achieve. Instead of showing conticent patience to invenit an
undercover strategy that allowed the unsuspecting extremists to come on the
street on their own and thus enter the waiting dragnet of security sleuths or
entering their den as friends with the help of undercover agents, our cops used
the first available opportunity to spoil the advantage of surprise that fell into
their hands by openly surrounding the building and thought of storming it while
even the average newspaper reader knew a coup sur that the first reaction of the
extremists when they were cornered would be the felo de se. What transpired
ultimately there by the acte gratuit was not only the suicide by the extremists, it
was the fetish suicide of the operation to catch the extremists alive. India and the
Rajiv Gandhi assassination investigation gained nothing by the the extremists'
death. They would have been more useful to India and the investigation had
they remained alive in India or anywhere in the world. All hopes were doused
per saltum by the senseless seizure of the hideout, ironically, using a vital piece
of intelligence that would have made the Rajiv Gandhi assassination
investigation a true success story of the 20th century. The glitch itself is a
tragedy.
Micro-and macro-security planning
The primary reason for such bungling is that Indian sleuths have not yet
realised the intricacies of security operation. Their perception of security
operation does not go much beyond multiple crack-forces, created one after the
other like the Black Cats, National Security Guards, Special Protection Group
etc. Perhaps some more are to follow at the cost of the state exchequer. Indeed,
these crack forces are important. They are the ammunitions of the security
weaponry. However effective the ammunitions be, they are worthless without a
working gun to fire them. It is the situation of the present Indian security
atmosphere. India is yet to develop an effective infrastructure to plan security
strategies at micro and macro levels. In the absence of such a machinery, the
Indian security system is bound to react with struts and frets; mere random reactions depending on the fancies of the person in charge of the situation.
Never should the internal security of a country be left in the hands of a few
individuals; the vital interests of the country cannot be based on casual decisions
of a few security sleuths. An exhaustive internal security plan on which all
security strategies and operations are based must be the gospel of the internal
security religion. Sadly, India is yet to have such a macro-plan to guide its
security sleuths; it is yet to realise the inevitability of the macro-plan in reacting
to security threats.
Model internal security schemes
The present perception of internal security in India revolves round a few
catchwords like prohibited areas, protected areas, official secrets, sensitive
installations, static guards, armed pickets, mobile patrols, striking forces,
perimeter protection, infiltration, mechanical breakdown, external and internal
attacks, verification, unobtrusive watch, internal watch, intelligence collection,
top-secret papers, security information, leakage of information etc. Model
internal security schemes, containing jugglery of these words are available in all
district and police offices. The plans in the security schemes are intended as
guidelines for police officers during security emergencies which is rarely the
case for various reasons. The first and foremost reason is that the model
schemes are anything but model, being too simplistic for this complex modem
age. The plans in the schemes do not touch even the fringes of the present
security needs. Secondly, the model schemes are based on outdated facts and
statistics which became irrelevant in postliminary periods. Though these model
schemes are expected to be updated from time to time, seldom are they touched.
This renders them irrelevant to a given phase of time. Thirdly, the security
guidelines in the model schemes can in no way make a claim to expertise. They
are simple suggestions based on common sense. Any police official with a
sound field knowledge can improve on them according to specific instances by
relying on his own savvy. For all practical purposes, these model internal
security schemes have become passe and impair. They have only historical
interests in the neoteric scheme of things.
Contents of model security schemes
The model security schemes enumerate in terrorem the likely sources of
threats to the country's internal security such as aggression by an alien power,
sabotage and subversive activities, communal riots, student unrest, extremist
activities, violent labour problems, natural calamities etc. The schemes
distinguish between peacetime threats and wartime threats and deal with each period with various stages of approach like precautionary stage, preventive
measures and protective measures. What are striking in these schemes arc the
details of work to be attended to, like evacuation of lunatics, police-public
relations, peace committees, mobilisation of NCC and volunteer organisations
etc. But, unfortunately, there is nothing really instructive in these schemes for a
security officer of good field experience and sound common sense. The only
advantage the schemes provide is that all obvious measures are listed in a
raisonne nutshell for easy reference. But, as said before, albeit the measures
listed out are exhaustive as routine jobs to be performed in such disturbances,
they in no way help in tackling complex internal security challenges of the
present day. The reason for this is that the format of the schemes was conceived
decades back when challenges of internal security were simpler and on expected
lines. No serious thought was given to overhauling the format of the schemes
since then. The position though is similar in respect of the blue book which
deals with aspects of security for dignitaries, political compulsions helped to
update them as more and more dignitaries fell to the bullets of extremists. The
updating of the blue book is one of the plus points of the subservience of the
police to political masters. Yet, the blue book too needs a complete overhauling
on the basis of the new realities of security challenges and new perceptions and
conceptions about meeting such challenges.
Parameters of new security schemes
What the new blue book and new model internal security schemes need are
guidelines on how to approach a security challenge and not what peripheral
matters should be attended to. Each security challenge of the present day is sui
generis and needs a specific approach depending upon the time, the place and
other circumstances of the challenge. It is too simplistic to imagine that a
common formula, however exhaustive it be, can tackle all internal security
challenges of the present day. The blue book and model internal security
schemes must lay down broad guidelines and the spirit with which security
challenges must be approached, the nature and classes of such challenges,
available methods of approach for each class of challenge, salient features of the
risks involved and precautions to be attended to, alternative courses of action
and assessment of the chances of success for each course under different
circumstances etc. The security guidelines must name the nature of security
threats under various situations and list out likely targets of sabotage under all
imaginable circumstances. They must be able to forewarn about potential
sources of threats and suggest ways and means of overcoming them and invenit
short and long-range plans to meet likely serious challenges. Such an approach
to security relieves pressure on prototypal security and shifts stress to creative
security and saves manpower and other resources from being wasted on
unproductive quotidian mobilisation. This worlds as a panpharmacon to the
under-utilisation of precious security tools by unintelligent routine deployment.
Problems of security operation
The problems of security are manifold. In the stage of intelligence
collection, the plurisie of intelligence itself poses the problem of blunting the
edge of really vital intelligence. Often, true and false information are insomuch
entwined that winnowing the one from the other becomes impossible; even if
such a piece of information is identified as possibly true, it gets emaciated by
the loss of credibility because of its locus standi in the midst of the heaps of
intelligence that are sometimes true and many more times mendacious. Even if
a piece of intelligence is winnowed out as true for further action, more often,
than not, the intelligence is an isolated piece of information and ipso facto
removed from the adversary's total action plan. Such a piece of intelligence,
many a time, leads to wrong conclusions and dangerous situations. Continued
research per procurationem the piece of intelligence is a must to make it
complete and fit for action. The research of available intelligence requires
motivated intelligence operation which is not possible without an elaborate and
anfractuous infrastructure. If the particular piece of intelligence does not fall
into place by such research, it may end up as an indign piece of information.
The useful intelligence that falls in place by research requires to be subjected to
analysis and study to test and substruct the situation and circumstances of both
the challenge and the means to amate the challenge. This again depends upon
the skill and experience of the individual or group of individuals who handle the
job. Often, both the research and analysis are carried out under the constraints of
time because of the proximity of the threat Even while security operation is
based on the research and analysis of intelligence, the basic intelligence and its
sources are required to be kept as a closely guarded secret. Any leakage about
an impending plan may prompt an adversary to modify his strategy to superate
the security operation. This necessitates every security operation to be esoteric
in its substance and scope and carried out with perfect elements of surprise. This
creates problems of mobilisation and deployment without rousing suspicion.
The men to handle the security operation should be handpicked for competence
and probity. Their antecedents and recent activities must be closely examined
before they are cleared. It is the failure of security agencies to effectively carry
out such preparations that cost India Smt. Indira Gandhi. The briefing of
security operators about their job itself poses its own problem. The time of
briefing must be carefully chosen so that while the gap between the impending
operation and the briefing gives sufficient time to the operators for preparation,
it must not be so long as to give them louche ideas or to allow any inadvertent
actions to leak the plan. The timing of briefing and development must be
decided at high levels to ensure perfect secrecy. Another crucial problem of
security, operation pertains to the quantum of briefing: how much must be
briefed? Security operation basically involves the creative initiative of the
operator. His success depends upon his ability to assess the situation and pursue
better course of action sans loss of time. Too much briefing trammels the mind
and results in loss of creative initiative. Too little may fail to provide the insight
into salient features of the operation and leave the operator in a cul-de-sac. The
success of a security operation depends also on deciding how much briefing
must be made to each of the operators at disparate ranks and levels and how
much information and background knowledge can be fed to them. Here again,
liberal outlets for vital information create security risks. The primary
requirement of any security operation is a thorough study and analysis of
intelligence and other inputs, a detailed conception of the plan of operation with
adaptability for contingencies and painstaking in execution with a resourceful
mind and quick reflexes to meet such contingencies, if any.
Timing of operation
Timing is an essential ingredient of the security planning. Perchance, this is
the most significant single ingredient that decides the success or failure of an
operation. Apart from infusing the element of surprise, the time-factor provides
for making the strike while the adversary is mentally and physically least
prepared for it. Often, the right time helps the operation to succeed with right
contents which may not be possible otherwise because of the alertness of an
equally skeely and prepared adversary. The failure of Indian security forces to
capture Sivarasan and Subha can be attributed to the swither and inexplicable
cunctation of nearly 1 1/2 days for action after it was inadvertently made known
to the terrorists that they were cornered with no recourse for survival.
Unfortunately, the police force discounted the time-factor and the bevue ended
up in tragic perdition to the investigation which would have otherwise turned
out to be a world event, a plangent success story of the century.
Relevance of traditional approach
Not that everything of traditional approach to security is irrelevant today.
Certain aspects therein are indeed sempiternal tools in a security buildup. The
strategy of quadruple deployment namely static guards, armed pickets, mobile
patrols and striking forces yet constitute the skeleton of any security buildup for
a static target. The strategy takes the form of standing guards, personal security
officer, inner cordon, outer cordon and striking force in respect of a human
target. Its derivative for a mobile target is a security officer, escort, piloting and striking force. The in-built deployment though it in no way pre-empts a
raisonne strike by a perficient outfit, perforce provides a semblance of
resistance to random strikes and gives a psychological advantage to security in
the form of a show of strength. However, it should be borne in mind that this
strategy in no way replaces specific security strategies; it only complements
them.
Security, its challenges and the strategies to counter it are ever-growing
phenomena. Security and its challenges change their colours like chameleons
and force strategies that counter them to keep pace pari passu. An effective
strategy must foresee future challenges and arm itself in advance for them.
Otherwise, the security is bound to be indign of its raison d' etre. It must be
said that Indian security agencies do not meet this cardinal need. Not that India
has no concern for its internal security. It is surrounded by bloodcurdling
terrorist outfits from all sides. The Kashmir separatist movement in the North,
the Akali separatist movement in the west, the ULFA in the East, the LTTEs in
the South and the Naxalites in the Centre comminate a corps perdu, India's
internal security and very survival. The number of new security outfits coming
up is an indication of India's concern for its security. The triste part of the spiel
is that India yet does not know how to face these gauntlets to its very existence
and the misplaced emphasis on quantity in the form of a new security outfit
every time a serious security breach shakes the country, rather than building
quality, complicated the matter. Indian security standards have not made
kenspeckle headway pro rata to the rise in expenditure incurred thereon in
recent years because India is yet to gain an insight into the salient features of
security in the modem complex political world that learnt to achieve its goals
by comminations and bullets. Until India learns the basic lessons of modem
security, tragic deaths and destruction are bound to continue. Ergo, India must
act pronto.
posted by praveen # 8:37 PM 
